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Abstract 
As regulators, central banks can play a stabilising role, using prudential regulation to en-
sure financial system stability, and a transformative role, using regulation to promote fi-
nancial system development and so encourage financial deepening and inclusion. While 
there are strong arguments for central banks seeking to strike a balance between their sta-
bilising and transformative roles in financial regulation, African central banks have had 
difficulties in this respect. This paper presents case studies from Nigeria, Uganda and 
Kenya that show how central banks have historically tended to emphasise one role rather 
than the other. Reforms that seek to improve the balance between the stabilising and trans-
formative roles of central banks in financial regulation are difficult because interest groups 
with the power to shape central bank behaviour tend to prefer the regulatory status quo 
and may try to capture regulatory reform processes. As facilitators of financial reform 
processes in many African countries, donors should systematically address the challenges 
posed by regulatory capture with a view to maximising the effectiveness of their support 
for regulatory reforms. 
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1 Introduction 
Central banks are key institutions to govern finance and the economy more generally. 
They may play a stabilising role by using monetary policy to ensure price stability and 
prudential regulation to ensure the stability of the financial system. They may also play a 
transformative role and use their regulatory powers to promote the development of a fi-
nancial system that focuses on channelling financial resources into productive investment 
by actively encouraging financial deepening and inclusion. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there has been an intense debate in African1 
countries on the direction – promoting stability, economic transformation or both – their 
central banks as regulators should be taking. Advocates of a stabilising role seem to be 
dominating the discussion about the future role of central banks after what is deemed to 
have been the worst financial crisis ever. And yet a view emerging among African policy-
makers and development practitioners is that central banks should play a role that goes 
beyond safeguarding monetary and financial stability and seeks to develop a responsible 
financial sector, particularly through regulation that provides an enabling environment for 
the outreach of financial services (De la Torre et al. 2007; CGAP 2011; CGAP 2010; Beck 
et al. 2011). This view is based on two important arguments. The first is that, by playing a 
transformative role, central banks can reduce risk in the financial sector: while prudential 
regulation may go some way towards precluding banking distress, the recurrent nature of 
financial crises around the world suggests that such regulation is not enough to prevent 
crises (New Economics Foundation 2009). From this perspective, prudential regulation 
should be complemented by measures that seek to encourage a different structure for the 
financial system. As regulators, central banks are best placed to create an institutional en-
vironment that supports the transformation to a financial system which diversifies risk by 
providing a broad range of financial services for different customers rather than engaging 
in a narrow range of short-term, possibly speculative activities (Hannig / Jansen 2010; 
Hawkins 2011). The second argument is that, where central banks’ stabilising and trans-
formative roles complement each other, this may help to ensure that financial systems ful-
fil their original purpose of mobilising long-term capital and allocating it to the most pro-
ductive sectors, firms and individuals in the economy (Epstein 2005; Epstein 2006; 
Maxfield 1990). Although these arguments have convinced many policy-makers that cen-
tral banks should seek to balance their stabilising role with a more transformative role, 
African countries have had difficulty striking such a balance and reforming financial regu-
lation accordingly. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to illustrate and explain the political challenges 
faced by African central banks in striking a better balance between their stabilising and 
transformative roles in financial regulation; second, to recommend to donors ways of mak-
ing their support for financial regulatory reform more effective by addressing these politi-
cal challenges. 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise stated, the term Africa in this paper refers to sub-Saharan Africa. 
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This paper adopts a political economy approach to explain the variation of central bank 
roles across Africa and their stickiness over time. What little research has been conducted 
into central banking in Africa has largely been technical and so has little to say about the 
political challenges to financial regulatory reform. The paper therefore builds on both po-
litical economy theory and data derived from interviews with key political decision-
makers, donors and researchers in three African countries, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya. 
Both theory and the findings of field research in these three countries suggest that the fi-
nancial needs of powerful interest groups have shaped their central bank policies, and that 
such groups seek to maintain the status quo in financial regulation. Reforms of financial 
regulation that aim at improving the balance between the stabilising and transformative 
roles of central banks are difficult because these interest groups have an incentive to cap-
ture regulatory reform processes. Based on these insights, the paper recommends that do-
nors, as facilitators of financial reform processes in Africa, should systematically address 
the challenges posed by regulatory capture with a view to improving their support for 
regulatory reforms. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections: section 2 outlines the research 
design and methodological issues to provide a background to the context in which the re-
search has taken place. Section 3 illustrates, from a historical perspective, the extent to 
which African countries have managed to strike a balance between the stabilising and 
transformative roles of central banks in financial regulation, taking Nigeria, Uganda and 
Kenya as examples. Section 4 explains the ways in which powerful interest groups may 
pose a challenge to reforms that seek to improve the balance between the stabilising and 
transformative roles of central banks in financial regulation. Section 5 puts forward a 
number of recommendations for improving the effectiveness of financial regulatory re-
form where there is a risk of capture. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Research design and methodology 
As this is the first phase of a larger research project on the comparative political economy 
of central banking in Africa, this paper focuses primarily on setting the scene by illustrat-
ing the political challenges to reforms of financial regulation aimed at improving the bal-
ance between the stabilising and transformative roles of central banks. It is less concerned 
with developing the underlying theory. In particular, it places less emphasis on reviewing 
the relevant theory, giving precise definitions of terms and hypotheses, testing proposi-
tions against alternative explanations or making generalisable claims. Rather, it seems 
important in the first phase of the multi-country study to set the scene by illustrating and 
explaining the political challenges to regulatory reforms aimed at improving financial sta-
bility or financial deepening and inclusion, taking three African countries as examples. As 
a result, the conclusions drawn remain locally specific. 
The decision not to provide precise definitions of terms at the present stage is also appar-
ent from the broad sense in which the terms ‘stabilising’ and ‘transformative’ are used to 
describe the roles of central banks in financial regulation. A central bank is considered to 
play a stabilising role where it uses prudential regulation to improve financial system sta-
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bility. The extent to which a central bank plays this stabilising role is reflected in the strin-
gency of prudential regulation. Prudential policies typically seek to build up sufficient 
capital in financial institutions for them to cover expected and unexpected losses, achieve 
or maintain a manageable level of non-performing loans, address maturity or currency 
mismatches and strengthen the powers of financial supervisors. In contrast, a central bank 
is considered to play a transformative role where it uses regulation to encourage financial 
deepening and inclusion with a view to promoting financial intermediation, i.e. an increase 
in the level of financial resources that the financial sector channels into productive in-
vestment. The extent to which a central bank plays a transformative role is reflected in 
how activist it is in formulating regulation to encourage financial deepening and inclusion. 
In developing countries, central banks trying to play a transformative role typically use a 
variety of regulatory policies to promote better and more efficient access to financial ser-
vices for un- or underserved segments of the private sector, such as small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), micro-entrepreneurs and agriculture (Soludo 2009, 12; Epstein 
2006; CGAP 2010, 16-22; Claessens et al. 2009). Thus the distinction made in this paper 
between the stabilising and transformative roles played by central banks serves to show 
how they occupy different positions on a spectrum of the stringency of prudential regula-
tion and on a spectrum of regulatory activism in pursuit of financial deepening and inclu-
sion. Besides financial regulations, strategy documents and technical units within central 
banks mandated to promote financial stability or financial deepening and inclusion indi-
cate how far they pursue their transformative and stabilising roles (Čihák 2010; 
Cukierman et al. 1992; CGAP 2010). 
The distinction made between a central bank’s stabilising and transformative roles is 
therefore not binary: a central bank can play both roles at the same time, to varying de-
grees. However, there are not only synergies but also trade-offs between the two roles in 
financial regulation, at least in the short and medium term. Table 1 gives some examples 
of regulatory policies that central banks in developing countries have been pursuing, with 
varying levels of success, to improve financial stability and/or financial intermediation. In 
some cases, the regulatory policies adopted to promote one objective also help the other to 
be achieved. Regulation designed to develop credit reporting through credit bureaus, to 
take one example, is likely to have the effect of directly promoting both financial stability 
and financial intermediation. In other cases, regulatory policies pursued to achieve one 
objective may pose risks to achieving the other objective. For instance, spurring competi-
tion through the lowering of barriers to entry may have a positive effect on financial in-
termediation, but pose a risk to financial stability if regulators do not address the trade-off 
in the design of policies. 
The roles that central banks play as they seek to promote financial intermediation may 
vary in activism from providing a framework for financial deepening and inclusion that 
also helps to improve financial stability to providing a framework for financial deepening 
and inclusion that so encourages financial market activities that stability is put at risk. 
Florence Dafe 
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If more ambitious transformative approaches are not implemented satisfactorily (e.g. be-
cause of a lack of technical capacity, corruption or regulatory capture), effects on financial 
stability may be highly negative. Better technical capacity and a supportive political envi-
ronment may allow countries to become more activist without posing undue risks to finan-
cial stability. Similarly, roles that central banks seeking to promote financial stability play 
may vary in the stringency of their prudential regulation from providing a framework for 
financial stability that also promotes financial intermediation to providing a framework for 
financial stability that so restricts market activities that financial intermediation is put at 
risk and becomes costly. Reforms aimed at improving the balance between the stabilising 
Table 1: Transformative and stabilising roles: examples of regulatory policies 
 
Regulation to… 
Expected contribution to the objective of 
promoting 
financial deepening 
and inclusion 
financial stability 
… promote financial literacy + + 
.. . promote consumer protection + + 
… develop credit reporting + + 
... allow non-financial firms (e.g. telecom providers) to 
provide banking services 
+ - 
… lower barriers to entry to spur competition + - 
… specify lending requirements for banks to increase 
credit to private sector 
+ - 
… keep interest rates low through credit ceilings  - 
…establish credit guarantee schemes +  
… ensure robust monitoring and enforcement of rules by 
the central bank (e.g. right to revoke banking licences) 
 + 
…specify high minimum capital adequacy requirements - + 
… limit short-term funding of domestic banks - + 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. Notes: + = Policymakers expect positive contribution; this usually pro-
vides the rationale for implementing the respective regulatory policy; - = Policymakers expect 
negative contribution if regulators do not address the trade-off between promoting financial 
deepening and inclusion and promoting financial stability in the design of policies; empty cell: 
no or indeterminate contribution expected 
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and transformative roles of central banks may operate in both directions: on the one hand, 
they seek to detect deficiencies in the regulatory framework designed to promote financial 
deepening and inclusion and so to improve it that it takes better account of risks to finan-
cial stability. On the other hand, these reforms seek to detect deficiencies in prudential 
regulation and so to improve it that it takes better account of risks to financial intermedia-
tion. 
The specific positions that central banks occupy along the spectra largely reflect the views 
held on how financial and economic systems work and political economy factors. For in-
stance, the fact that a central bank emphasises its stabilising rather than its transformative 
role does not necessarily indicate that the government or central bankers are indifferent to 
growth and development. Rather, it may indicate that they regard the assurance of finan-
cial stability as the best way to generate sustainable growth. From this perspective, proac-
tive attempts to generate development are likely to fail and damage long-term growth 
prospects. Alternatively, the view held may be that ensuring financial stability will not 
lead to a successful, market-led development process, but that that process needs to be 
encouraged by more activist financial development policies. Thus central banks in differ-
ent countries may be equally committed to promoting economic development and yet be-
have very differently because they have different ‘models’ of economic development. 
Taking three country cases, this paper illustrates the diversity of positions occupied by 
central banks along the spectra of the stringency of prudential regulation and of activism 
in regulation aimed at financial deepening and inclusion. It also demonstrates how politi-
cal and economic factors combine to encourage the creation and maintenance of a central 
bank that reflects a particular ‘model’ of how economies work and occupies a particular 
position on the spectrum. 
Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya have been selected as the country cases by the diverse case 
method (Seawright / Gerring 2008, 300-301). Based on this method, the research identi-
fied a set of cases of sub-Saharan African countries that encompasses a wide range of val-
ues with respect to two proposed key explanatory variables, namely the level of develop-
ment of the domestic financial sector and the sources of public finance. Nigeria was cho-
sen because of the little research so far conducted on its central bank policy despite the 
importance of the economic and political weight the country carries in Africa. Nigeria 
does not have a well developed financial system, considering the level of its national in-
come: financial intermediation is limited because the financial system is not well diversi-
fied, but focuses on the higher end of the market and offers a limited range of products 
(Sanusi 2010). Moreover, the unsound conduct of banks has repeatedly caused banking 
distress in past decades. Oil is the major source of revenue for the Government of Nigeria, 
because the non-oil productive sector is weakly developed. Nigeria therefore allows to 
explore the effect that natural resource dependence has on central bank behaviour. Uganda 
and Kenya were chosen because they differ from Nigeria where the proposed key explana-
tory variables of financial development and sources of public finance are concerned. 
Uganda’s financial sector is among the least developed in Africa in terms of size, diver-
sity, efficiency and financial intermediation (Egesa 2010; Beck / Hesse 2009, 195; 
Kasekende 2010a, 74-76). The Government of Uganda relies heavily on foreign aid to 
finance government expenditure. Taxes have yet to become the single most important 
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source of government revenue: the productive sectors are weakly developed, as is evident 
from the ‘missing middle’, with a small number of large enterprises, a large number of 
micro-enterprises and the prevalence of subsistence agriculture. In contrast, the financial 
system in Kenya is among the most developed in Africa in terms of diversity, size and 
financial intermediation. The Government of Kenya relies heavily on taxation as a 
source of revenue, since the productive sectors in Kenya are relatively well developed 
(African Economic Outlook 2011a). Kenya compares favourably with other African 
economies with respect to the commercialisation of agriculture and the diversity of the 
size of firms in the productive sector. As the financial systems in Nigeria, Uganda and 
Kenya are still, as elsewhere in Africa, very much bank-based, this research explores the 
political economy of financial regulation focusing primarily on the regulation of banking 
services. 
Methodologically, the research is based on a combination of secondary literature, quantita-
tive data and extensive interviews with policy-makers, donors and researchers in Nigeria, 
Uganda and Kenya. Secondary literature on African political economy and more technical 
literature on monetary and financial policy in addition to literature on the political econ-
omy of finance have been studied. The quantitative data present a detailed picture of the 
macroeconomic and financial development in the three case study countries over time. 
The data indicate that a combination of economic and political factors may pose chal-
lenges to regulatory reform. The interviews are a key research input because they have 
helped to ensure that the story told reflects an assessment of what those involved in finan-
cial reform processes consider to be key success factors for and challenges to effective 
regulatory reform. 
3 Striking a balance between stabilisation and transformation: central 
bank policy trajectories in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya 
This section identifies the challenges African countries face where they seek to reform 
financial regulation in order to strike a better balance between the stabilising and trans-
formative roles of their central banks. With Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya taken as exam-
ples, this section presents historical narratives to illustrate the diversity of the roles played 
by central banks and to describe how far these countries have sought to strike a balance 
between the stabilising and transformative roles of their central banks in financial regula-
tion and how far they have succeeded. The historical perspective shows the difficulty of 
adapting the overall thrust of central bank regulation to changing circumstances, highlight-
ing the path dependency of central banking. 
3.1 Continuity in the transformative mandate: the Central Bank of Nigeria 
When Nigeria became independent in 1960, banks, both foreign and indigenous, played no 
role in financing the domestic private sector or economic development more generally: 
Expatriate banks focused on providing banking services for British commercial enterprises 
and short-term trading activities rather than mobilising long-term capital for development 
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and the growth of domestic business (Brownbridge 1998c, 106). As the indigenous bank-
ing system was weakly developed and in financial distress at the time of independence 
(Uche 1997, 224), it was in no position to finance Nigeria’s development needs. After 
independence, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) therefore focused increasingly on fund-
ing government financing needs and providing financial support for a weakly developed 
banking sector. Indeed, strengthening Nigerian banks and mobilising capital had been the 
key objectives of the CBN’s establishment in 1958 (Uche 1997). 
From the 1970s in particular, economic aspirations motivated developmental central bank 
policies that sought to influence the allocation of financial resources through extensive 
regulation of the banking sector. Allocative controls, such as interest rate controls and the 
direction of credit to development priority sectors and parastatal enterprises, rather than 
prudential controls, became the CBN’s primary regulatory concerns (Brownbridge 1998c, 
106). Until the CBN issued new prudential guidelines in 1991, banking regulation allowed 
banks, for instance, to conceal the true state of their balance sheets by not requiring them 
to classify loans according to quality or to make provisions for non-performing loans. 
Moreover, the CBN pursued “an implicit policy of not allowing banks to fail” 
(Brownbridge 1998c, 119): banks with liquidity shortages had recourse to the CBN, re-
gardless of the quality of their management (Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 2009). 
The CBN further neglected its stabilising role when oil prices fell in the early 1980s, and 
the government became increasingly unable to control the budget deficit, as Figure 1 
shows. Between 1990 and 1994, 86 per cent of the federal budget deficit was financed by 
the domestic banking system, mainly by the CBN (Brownbridge 1998c, 122; Central Bank 
of Nigeria 1994, 17). 
The effects of the central bank policy, which placed the emphasis on the transformative 
role at the expense of the stabilising role, on the financial sector and the real economy 
Figure 1: Nigeria, budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: CBN, Statistical Bulletin 
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were devastating. By the mid-1990s, the Nigerian financial system was in a state of col-
lapse: in 1992, eight banks were insolvent and 45 per cent of bank loans non-performing. 
In 1995, the CBN classified nearly half of the 81 local banks as distressed (Brownbridge 
1998c, 116). Many banks suffered from distress because the requirements relating to lend-
ing to risk sectors, mismanagement and fraud, particularly lending to politically well con-
nected, but uncreditworthy individuals, had increased the ratio of non-performing to total 
loans (Daumont et al. 2004, 38-40). Non-performing loan ratios were also high because 
higher interest rates stemming from rising inflation (see Figure 2) made it difficult for the 
real sector to service its debts (Brownbridge 1998c, 117). Nor were banks able to mobilise 
deposits because negative real interest rates had depressed saving rates and bank failures 
had destroyed confidence in the banking sector. Thus, after three decades of central bank 
policy emphasizing a transformative role, banks had become increasingly overdrawn on 
CBN accounts and dependent on government support for survival. 
 
The regulatory regime also hurt the real economy. While the oil boom of the 1970s had 
expanded investment opportunities and strengthened the small indigenous capitalist class, 
private sector development was stagnant by the mid 1980s: the growing disarray in the 
wider economy and the weakness of the banking sector starved the real economy of the 
credit necessary for investment and growth. Figure 3 shows that domestic credit to the 
private sector as a share of GDP, which had risen between 1970 and 1985, fell between the 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. The government’s revenue needs, the banking distress and the 
contraction of credit strengthened the constituency in both the public and the private sector 
for a transformative central bank that provided subsidised credit, credit guarantees and 
overdraft facilities for the government and banks. 
 
Figure 2: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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As there was a strong domestic constituency opposed to changing the CBN’s transforma-
tive mandate, the financial reform process was lengthy, inconsistent and limited in scope 
and effect. Hit by declining petroleum prices, macroeconomic instability and rising exter-
nal debt, Nigerian leaders launched a financial reform programme in 1986 (Lewis / Stein 
1997). Yet reforms designed to deregulate the banking sector and strengthen prudential 
regulation were deficient in many ways. For instance, the CBN removed and reintroduced 
some allocative regulations, such as interest rate and foreign exchange controls, several 
times during the 1980s and 1990s (Lewis / Stein 1997). The CBN also reformed prudential 
regulation and supervision, because it had become less willing to accommodate the finan-
cial needs of banks in distress, but the effects were limited: from the late 1980s, the CBN 
had applied a combination of a mechanism for dealing with distressed banks, limited de-
posit insurance and stricter prudential standards (Brownbridge 1998c, 120). In particular, 
it introduced higher capital adequacy requirements in 1990 and new prudential guidelines 
directing banks to classify loans according to whether they were being serviced, to make 
provisions for non-performing loans and to suspend unpaid interest from income 
(Brownbridge 1998c, 120). Yet the large number of financial institutions, limited supervi-
sory capacities and collusion among regulators and banks combined to prevent the central 
banks from playing its stabilising role more effectively (Brownbridge 1998c, 121). Mac-
roeconomic instability and the severe crisis in the real sector complicated the reform pro-
cess and made it difficult to buy political support for regulatory reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s. Nor did the reforms of financial regulation fulfil their primary purpose of reallocat-
ing credit from the public to the private sector: the increase in bank lending to the gov-
ernment to finance rising budget deficits and the risks inherent in lending to a weak busi-
ness sector depressed private sector lending until the mid-1990s. 
 
Figure 3: Domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Over the past decade, Nigeria has experienced major changes in the political and eco-
nomic spheres. First, military rule ended in 1999, with the transition to democracy under 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, and a number of reforms were implemented in the public 
service and economic spheres. Second, the macroeconomic environment improved re-
markably: since 2000, Nigeria has experienced moderate growth and inflation has been 
more stable. Figure 4 shows that budget deficits have been shrinking. The strong eco-
nomic performance is attributable in large measure to good rains and strong oil prices. 
Figure 4: Budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: The International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
Figure 5: Nigeria, ratio oil revenue to total federal government revenue 
 
 
Source: CBN, Statistical Bulletin 
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Policy-makers have realised that the foundations of Nigeria’s growth are fragile because 
its economic prosperity and ability to satisfy key constituencies depend on a booming oil 
sector. Oil and gas production dominate the economy, accounting in 2009 for 90 per cent 
of exports and, as Figure 5 shows, over 80 per cent of government revenues (African 
Economic Outlook 2011c). Successive governments have therefore emphasised the impor-
tance of diversifying the export base. Nigeria’s national development plan, Vision 2020, 
outlines a path to economic diversification aimed at transforming the country into one of 
the world’s top 20 economies by the year 2020. 
While entrepreneurs are in dire need of external financing to enable the transition to a di-
versified economy to be made, the banking sector does not yet seem prepared to provide 
the amount of credit necessary for structural transformation (Sanusi 2011). Although Ni-
gerian banks have developed new products for consumer, corporate and project finance 
and there has been an upward trend in credit provision during the last few years, Nigeria’s 
domestic credit as a share of GDP is, at an average of only 14 per cent between 2000 and 
2004 and 21 per cent between 2005 and 2008, low compared to such African peers as 
South Africa and Kenya, where domestic credit between 2005 and 2008 reached 151 and 
27 per cent respectively (Allen et al. 2010; Kasekende 2010a, 79). In addition, Nigerian 
banks concentrate their lending activities on the oil, gas, and communications sectors, 
which can be served by relatively low-risk, short-term loans, and tend to neglect other 
development priority sectors, particularly agriculture (Central Bank of Nigeria 2010, 71). 
Furthermore, Nigerian banks have to some extent remained reliant on the government, 
both as a client and as a provider of capital in times of distress. As elsewhere in Africa, 
Nigerian banks tend to rely on the government as a client because they prefer to invest 
their resources in liquid, low-risk assets, such as government securities (Honohan / Beck 
2007, 30, 34, 76). Between 2000 and 2009, for instance, claims on the government 
amounted to 14 per cent of total assets, whereas claims on the private sector constituted 38 
per cent of total assets. Banks have continued to rely on the government as a provider of 
capital in times of distress because, in an environment of rapid credit growth, corporate 
governance problems have periodically caused some banks financial distress (Olayiwola 
2010). In 2009, for example, the CBN bailed out nine banks and found that, in five of 
them, fraudulent practices and mismanagement had magnified the liquidity problems 
caused by the global financial crisis (Sanusi 2010, 14). The financial sector’s weaknesses 
and the productive sector’s limited access to finance explain the continued support within 
the public and private sectors for a transformative central bank that takes the lead in pro-
moting financial and economic development. 
The emphasis on the transformative role is also evident from recent regulatory reforms. 
While there have been far-reaching reforms in the area of stabilisation, such as the 
strengthening of risk-focused regulation, the adoption in 2009 of a common accounting 
year end for all banks, the aim being to improve data integrity and comparability, and the 
increase in central bank autonomy brought about by the CBN Act of 2007, the CBN has 
maintained a strong focus on financial sector development and outreach (Sanusi 2010; 
Soludo 2004; Soludo 2009, 10). For instance, the CBN has a Development Finance De-
partment running various schemes to improve financial access for SMEs, the agricultural 
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and other development priority sectors. Moreover, the CBN’s main objective of the con-
solidation of the banking sector in 2004/2005, to give an example of a major reform in the 
past decade, was to promote the development of an internationally competitive banking 
sector through more stringent capitalisation requirements (Soludo 2004). The CBN also 
hoped that this consolidation would increase competition and force banks to broaden their 
customer base, so that the banking sector might better serve the needs of the real economy 
(Soludo 2004). The CBN’s transformative mandate is also evident from its long-term pol-
icy document, the Financial System Strategy (FSS) 2020, which complements Vision 
2020. FSS 2020 emphasises that financial sector development is a key instrument for eco-
nomic diversification and outlines the path to Nigeria’s transformation into an interna-
tional financial centre, with the CBN taking the lead in the financial development process. 
3.2 Transformation towards stabilisation: the Bank of Uganda 
While the setup of the Bank of Uganda (BoU) was orthodox when it began operations in 
1966, the financing needs of the government and the private sector at the time of inde-
pendence soon created a constituency for a more transformative central bank. Initially, the 
BoU’s mission was conservative because the Ugandan government was seeking to create 
confidence in the currency and to encourage international lending to Uganda (Helleiner 
2001, 14). However, soon after the founding of the BoU, the government’s financing 
needs increased rapidly, partly because of the of the newly independent state’s develop-
ment needs, but also because financing a civil war strained government budgets under the 
regimes of Milton Obote (1962-1971 and 1980-1985) and Idi Amin (1971-1979). In addi-
tion, efforts to develop an indigenous business class required substantial external financ-
ing, because there were few Ugandan entrepreneurs at the time of independence and those 
with the potential to become entrepreneurs lacked private capital for investment 
(Moncrieffe 2004; Kasozi 1994). As the foreign-owned banking sector, being weakly de-
veloped in terms of size, diversity and inclusiveness, was failing to meet the government’s 
and private sector’s financing needs, it was generally agreed that economic development 
needed to be state-led and that the central bank must play a transformative role. 
As time passed, the BoU increasingly emphasised its transformative and neglected its sta-
bilising role. In its first decade of operation, it began to regulate the allocation of financial 
resources in the banking sector, particularly through interest rate and foreign exchange 
controls. The prudential regulation of banks was deficient in several respects. For instance, 
the Banking Act of 1969 did not impose clear restrictions on insider lending and was more 
explicit on allocative than prudential requirements. It did not grant the BoU the legal au-
thority to force banks to improve management, lending practices and internal controls 
without support from the Minister of Finance (Brownbridge 1998a, 136-137). Bank super-
vision was also inadequate: the BoU did not conduct on-site inspections and sometimes 
failed to analyse the bank returns submitted to it (Brownbridge 1998a, 133). Until the 
1990s, it automatically provided, at times of distress, liquidity support for public banks 
and the locally owned banks that had emerged in the 1980s (Brownbridge 1998a, 130). 
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The central bank policy, which emphasised financial development and neglected stability, 
severely damaged the financial sector and the real economy. Uganda suffered a prolonged 
economic decline from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, attributable partly to the civil war, 
but also to economic mismanagement. As the BoU financed large government deficits, 
inflation skyrocketed in the 1980s, averaging 103 per cent between 1981 and 1990 
(Brownbridge 1998a, 128-129). Negative real interest rates depressed saving and lending, 
further reducing financial depth and weakening banks. Banks became increasingly dis-
tressed from the 1980s onwards. By the early 1990s, the two public commercial banks, 
whose lending had been dictated mainly by political criteria, were insolvent because of 
high non-performing loan ratios. In 1994, half of the banking system had solvency prob-
lems, and by 1995 four of nine local banks had run into financial difficulties, forcing the 
BoU to close them down or restructure them (Brownbridge 1998a, 133). The distress in 
local banks was due to several factors: the tightness of financial markets, fraud and the 
lack of managerial capacity, the weakness of internal controls and deficiencies in the regu-
latory framework that allowed undercapitalised banks into the market. This environment 
was also difficult for private sector development: the productive sector continued to be 
excluded from bank finance because of tight liquidity, foreign banks’ conservative lending 
policies and the channelling of a substantial amount of subsidised credit to individuals 
with political connections. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, bank lending to the private 
sector averaged only 3.2 and 4.9 per cent of GDP respectively. 
In the mid-1980s, Uganda underwent a major economic and political transformation. In 
1986, Yoweri Museveni, the leader of the National Resistance Movement, came to power. 
A year later, the new regime launched a stabilisation programme and, in 1991, a financial 
sector adjustment programme. Uganda soon earned the reputation of being “a pioneer of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa” (Collier / 
Reinikka 2001, xiii). Figures 6 and 7 show that, from 1987 onwards, Uganda experienced 
a massive increase in foreign aid: during the 1990s aid rose to an average of 15.9 per cent 
of GNI, the ratio being similarly high from 2000 to 2008 (14.1 per cent of GNI), with aid 
accounting for 79 per cent of central government expenditure. The change of political re-
gime certainly facilitated a change of economic policy. Yet the main reason for the turn-
around in economic governance was that the cost of continuing the transformative policies 
was too high for an economy close to collapse, whose only available source of foreign 
exchange and government revenue was aid. In a context of aid dependence, donor prefer-
ences for an orthodox central bank also acted as a strong incentive to the government so to 
reform financial regulation that the emphasis was on the stabilising rather than the trans-
formative role of the BoU. 
The financial reform process, which began in 1991, was therefore consistent and took 
place in the context of a reduction in domestic borrowing and falling inflation. The gov-
ernment repaid a substantial amount of its debt to the banking system between 1992 and 
1994, and inflation fell from 63 per cent in 1991 to 16 per cent in 1994 (Brownbridge 
1998a, 139). As a result, real interest rates became positive and increased the liquidity and 
profitability of the banking sector. By the mid-1990s, the government removed allocative 
and interest rate controls. It also strengthened the BoU’s stabilising role by reforming pru-
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dential regulation and supervision and closing many regulatory gaps, as under the 1993 
Financial Institutions Statute. 
Figure 6: Net ODA received (% of GNI) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Figure 7: Net ODA received (% of central government expense) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Note: Data for Nigeria not provided. 
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Uganda has experienced a decade of relative stability since 2000: security has been re-
stored in most parts of the country, macroeconomic stability has been exceptional, and the 
economy has responded to reforms with an average growth rate of six per cent in the 
1990s and eight per cent since 2000. The budget deficit has been relatively stable and 
modest, although foreign aid still accounts for the majority of government revenue. 
Uganda’s banking sector has recovered from a serious crisis in 1998 and 1999: the health 
of the banking system has improved remarkably, following the closure of several dis-
tressed banks and further improvements in regulation and supervision. The remaining 
banks are well capitalised, profitable and resilient. In particular, Uganda’s banks have, as 
Figure 8 shows, a relatively low ratio of non-performing loans. However, while there has 
been an upward trend in lending to the private sector, banks tend to focus on serving the 
higher end of the market, prefer investing in low-risk government securities and are defi-
cient in the areas of financial intermediation, outreach and competitiveness (Beck / Hesse 
2009; Brownbridge / Tumusiime-Mutebile 2007, 200; Kasekende 2010a, 74). 
Although the BoU has become concerned about the limited degree to which the banking 
sector meets the financial needs of the still weakly developed real economy, the govern-
ment and the BoU itself see the BoU’s role primarily as the promoter of monetary and 
financial stability, rather than of financial deepening and inclusion (Bank of Uganda 
2000). Aid seems to have reinforced the preference for a stabilising central bank over the 
years: as it does not depend on domestic bank credit or on private sector taxes to finance 
the state apparatus and economic development policies, the government seems to have 
Figure 8: Ratio of bank non-performing loans to total gross loans (%) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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fewer incentives to push the BoU towards playing a more transformative role.2 Because of 
their strong financial position, the dominant banks in Uganda also form a powerful con-
stituency for a conservative central bank that controls inflation through tight monetary 
policy and does not overly interfere in operations through regulation that seeks to increase 
competition and consumer protection. 
The central bank’s emphasis on its stabilising role is also evident from major reforms in 
the past decade. Following the banking crisis in 1998/1999, the overall thrust of regulatory 
policy was directed towards “security, confidence and maintaining strong capitalisation 
rates” (Dzineku et al. 2009, 2). Further improvements were made in prudential regulation 
and bank supervision with the passing of the Financial Institutions Act in 2004 and the 
Financial Institutions Regulations in 2005. In particular, the BoU adopted unified account-
ing principles and standard reporting systems and introduced risk-based supervision. It 
also strengthened its technical capacity to perform its stabilising role by creating a finan-
cial stability department in 2007. At the same time, the BoU closed its development fi-
nance department so that it might concentrate more on its stabilising function (New Vision 
2006). 
Nevertheless, the BoU is becoming increasingly aware of the necessity of focusing more 
on the creation of an environment that enables access to financial services to be expanded 
if it is to better meet the needs of the real economy (Kagenda 2010). However, reforms to 
improve the balance between the BoU’s stabilising and transformative roles in financial 
regulation have been difficult, interviews in Uganda revealing that the main dilemma for 
the BoU in recent years has been to find ways of increasing financial intermediation with-
out contravening its model of a liberalised financial sector. Credit bureau reform, to take 
one example, has been a tedious, five-year process.3 Initially, banks were reluctant to share 
credit information on their customers with private credit bureaus on a voluntary basis. In-
terview data suggest that this reluctance was due to the need for some banks to invest con-
siderable resources in staff training and technical equipment for data-sharing and collec-
tive action problems among banks related to data-sharing.4 Consequently, the BoU had to 
make it mandatory for banks to share information with credit bureaus. The BoU has also 
made an effort to promote consumer protection and financial literacy. However, critics 
within the BoU and in the private sector have argued that activities in these fields would 
stretch the BoU’s mandate beyond its traditional stability concerns, and reforms have not 
yet reached implementation stage. Regulatory reforms in the area of consumer protection 
may also face resistance from banks, which, as interviews with aid officials and bankers 
                                                 
2
 
Moreover, aid-funded fiscal expansion has increased the volume of domestic liquidity, the BoU seeking, 
particularly between 1999 and 2002, to maintain monetary stability and a competitive exchange rate 
through the sale of government securities. This in turn crowded out private sector borrowing 
(Brownbridge / Tumusiime-Mutebile 2007; Killick / Foster 2011), reducing the scope for financial 
deepening and inclusion. 
3 Credit reference bureaus may have a positive effect on both financial access and financial system stabil-
ity by creating a credit history of borrowers and facilitating the screening of potential borrowers. 
4 These problems are not confined to Uganda. Mylenko (2008) provides a systematic overview of similar 
challenges that other African countries, including Nigeria and Kenya, have faced in developing credit 
bureaus. 
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confirmed, tend to prefer industry self-regulation. While these examples of recent reform 
initiatives suggest that the transformative role of the BoU is gaining in importance, they 
also indicate that there is a strong domestic constituency, within both the government and 
the banking sector, for the BoU to play a stabilising role. This constituency believes that 
maintaining the focus of central bank policy on financial and price stability is the best way 
to generate sustainable growth and that proactive attempts to promote financial system 
development are likely to fail, as they have in the past. The resilience of the banking sector 
in the face of the global financial crisis, due primarily to high prudential standards, seems 
to have strengthened this argument (Kasekende 2010b). 
3.3 In search of a balance between stabilisation and transformation: the Central 
Bank of Kenya 
Originally set up as an orthodox central bank, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) soon be-
came transformative in response to fiscal and economic pressures arising from a revenue-
needy government, a weakly developed banking sector and the need to increase productive 
investment. At the time of independence, the Kenyan government faced the challenge of 
mobilising revenues to finance the development of the state apparatus, its economic de-
velopment policies and the indigenous business sector. The banking sector, then consisting 
entirely of foreign-owned banks, did not play an important role in financing the develop-
ment needs of the emerging Kenyan entrepreneurs: controlled by their overseas parent 
companies, the banks’ lending policies were conservative and concentrated on prime busi-
ness borrowers and short-term, trade-related financing (Brownbridge 1998b, 82). As there 
was no locally owned banking sector in the 1960s, the Kenyan government chose the route 
of developmental central banking to channel financial resources into productive invest-
ments in Kenyan enterprises (Brownbridge 1998b, 81). 
While the CBK emphasised its transformative rather than its stabilising mandate, the de-
gree and nature of its market interventions were more modest than in many other African 
countries. Like the Nigerian and Ugandan central banks, the CBK sought to direct the de-
velopment of the financial sector and regulate the nature of its lending with interest rate 
and credit ceilings, but placed less emphasis on prudential controls and supervision. For 
instance, it rarely enforced mandatory requirements, although it had a number of instru-
ments, such as cash reserve requirements and liquid assets ratios, at its disposal 
(Brownbridge 1998b, 95-97). Furthermore, from the 1970s onwards, financial policy in 
Kenya was increasingly driven by fiscal policy considerations and the financial needs of 
the emerging indigenous banking sector (Brownbridge 1998b, 93-97; Helleiner 2003, 14). 
However, despite extensive intervention in financial markets, CBK regulation did not in-
terfere in lending decisions, except for the requirement that all commercial banks extend 
credit to agriculture amounting to at least 17 per cent of their deposit liabilities 
(Brownbridge 1998b, 82). Banks were thus able to continue lending primarily in accor-
dance with commercial criteria (Brownbridge 1998b, 87). 
As CBK interventions had been more selective, the effects of central bank policy were not 
as damaging as in many other African countries; yet macroeconomic instability weakened 
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the banking sector and the real economy. As Kenya’s inflation was relatively modest until 
the mid-1980s, real interest rates were sufficiently high to promote saving and lending 
despite interest rate controls (Brownbridge 1998b, 83). As a result, the financial system 
expanded between independence and the mid-1990s in terms of diversity, liquidity and 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. However, while the foreign-owned banks 
remained relatively healthy, locally owned private banks experienced two major episodes 
of financial fragility: one between 1984 and 1986, the other in the early 1990s. Misman-
agement and fraud, and particularly insider lending to politically connected individuals, 
were the primary causes of the banking distress (Brownbridge 1998b, 89-91; Daumont et 
al. 2004, 34-35). Growing macroeconomic instability, the loss of monetary control in 
1992/93 and deficiencies in bank regulation and supervision explain the banking crises. 
However, the weakness of local banks and the increase in government borrowing to fund 
rising budget deficits did not crowd out private sector borrowing completely, given the 
considerable size of the domestic financial system and the access to foreign capital that 
larger, established firms enjoyed (Brownbridge 1998b, 84). 
Although the fiscal crisis, balance of payment problems and banking sector distress made 
it increasingly difficult to sustain transformative policies, reforms in financial regulation 
stagnated during the 1980s and 1990s. To improve the balance between the central bank’s 
stabilising and transformative roles, the government sought to reform regulation in three 
major areas: first, the conduct of monetary policy to reduce budget deficits and govern-
ment reliance on domestic bank borrowing; second, the lifting of allocative controls; third, 
the strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision. Yet, on the whole, the reforms 
had only limited success. For instance, bank regulation and supervision were not effective 
in Kenya until 1993: although the CBK strengthened prudential legislation and supervi-
sory capacity between 1984 and 1989, political interference in the monitoring and en-
forcement of regulation limited the effectiveness of the reforms. As the CBK’s stabilising 
role had remained weak, Kenya experienced a major banking crisis in 1993, which finally 
led to more effective prudential regulation (Brownbridge 1998b, 96-97). The reform proc-
ess was difficult, because the regulatory status quo had the support of several stakeholders: 
the financially distressed local banking sector wanted to leave regulation as it was, since it 
relied on the central bank to provide it with liquidity support and sought to retain its busi-
ness models and management methods. The revenue-needy government had a preference 
for the regulatory status quo because it relied on the domestic banking system, including 
the central bank, to provide it with funds for the state apparatus and election campaigns, 
and to reward political supporters (Isaksson 2001, 503-504; Brownbridge 1998b, 99). 
In the past decade, Kenya has undergone political and economic regime change. When 
Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election against Daniel Arap Moi in December 2002, 
the new government inherited a weak economy and financial system. Supported by do-
nors, the Kenyan government set out a programme of economic reform, the Economic 
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation for 2003-2007. The immediate 
objective was to improve the macroeconomic environment, primarily through a reduction 
in the government’s domestic borrowing. In the ensuing years, the economy experienced a 
sustained recovery, and budget performance has improved remarkably as a result of an 
increase in aid and, foremost, tax revenue and the dismissal of excess public sector workers. 
The politics of central banking and implications for regulatory reform in sub-Saharan Africa 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 19 
The new government has faced the challenge of having to satisfy constituencies with di-
verging preferences with respect to the CBK’s role. On the one hand, the government’s 
immediate political and economic concern has been to secure credibility in the eyes of 
foreign investors, creditors and donors, who would prefer a central bank that focused on 
stabilisation. On the other hand, the government has had to strengthen its domestic politi-
cal and economic power base. Because of the diversity of the domestic private sector, its 
preferences with respect to central bank regulation are not uniform. The large, established 
banks, which have been financially sound throughout the past decade, have a preference 
for a central bank that concentrates its activities on stabilisation. Large and medium-sized 
enterprises also tend to prefer a central bank that focuses on stabilisation, because they 
have access to a wide range of financial services. In contrast, the smaller, local banks and 
firms, particularly agricultural producers, form a strong constituency for a central bank 
that plays a transformative role, especially by means of enabling regulation that provides 
incentives to improve the intermediation of financial resources into the real economy. Ac-
cess to external financial resources is still limited for micro and small enterprises and for 
the agricultural sector, which accounts for about a quarter of Kenya’s GDP (African 
Economic Outlook 2011b). These groups constitute a powerful constituency for reform in 
Kenya, because they form the backbone of the economy and the government relies on pri-
vate sector growth for the expansion of its tax base. Smaller, local banks also constitute a 
powerful constituency for reforms that seek to promote both development and stabilisa-
tion. These banks benefit from enabling regulation in that, in an environment where large 
banks already serve prime borrowers, they are forced to reach out to previously unserved 
segments, since the newly elected Kibaki government reduced domestic borrowing and so 
that t-bill rates fell. In interviews public officials pointed out that they are trying to support 
the efforts being made by small banks to increase outreach for two major reasons: first, 
greater outreach helps to reduce the informality of business5 and tax evasion by small-
scale, but prosperous enterprises; second, these efforts encourage firms to grow and so 
further enlarge the tax base and promote economic development. To satisfy all the major 
constituencies in Kenya, the government has developed its financial sector policy around 
three major objectives: expanding access, increasing efficiency and improving stability 
(Arora / Ferrand 2007). 
As a result, the reforms of financial regulation of the past decade have sought to promote 
both development and stabilisation. The CBK has become a model of a regulatory body 
that seeks to promote financial deepening and inclusion. Examples of recent reforms in-
clude the licensing of credit reference bureaus and, in 2010, the approval of agent banking, 
which allows banks to engage such third parties as small shops, petrol stations and other 
retail outlets to provide certain banking services. Vision 2030, Kenya’s long-term national 
development plan, outlines the goal of building an inclusive financial system and deter-
mines the CBK’s overall policy thrust (Ndung'u 2010). In general, the CBK has avoided 
direct interventions in the banking sector and tries to use moral suasion or to improve in-
centives for private sector-led financial inclusion. For example, the CBK has reduced the 
                                                 
5 The informal sector in Kenya is large, accounting for about 18 per cent of GDP (African Economic 
Outlook 2011a). 
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policy rates several times since 2007 to incentivise banks to lower interest rates, but has 
not given in to the consistent public pressure for interest rate caps, even when banks failed 
to respond with lower lending rates. The CBK has also earned a good reputation for bank-
ing supervision and regulation. In particular, its risk-based approach to mobile banking 
has become a model, since the CBK did not rush to regulate telecom providers developing 
banking services before the model had been tested (Alliance for Financial Inclusion 2010). 
Thus, while the cases of Nigeria and Uganda highlight the tension between a stabilising 
and a transformative role, the Kenyan case more generally suggests that there are huge 
benefits to be gained by economies whose central banks strike a balance between safe-
guarding financial stability and actively promoting the development of a financial system 
that serves the real economy. 
4 Challenging reformers: the power of groups with an interest in the status quo 
Although there are strong arguments for balancing the transformative and stabilising roles 
of central banks in financial regulation, African countries have had difficulty striking this 
balance. Many central banks across the continent have strengthened financial systems sig-
nificantly over the past decade, and today most African banking systems are stable, well-
capitalised and liquid. However, the development of the financial sector continues to pre-
sent some major challenges. In particular, financial systems do not yet adequately perform 
their main function of mobilising long-term, patient capital and allocating it to the most 
dynamic and productive sectors, firms and individuals in the real economy. There seems 
to be a consensus that it is time for regulators to be as successful in the areas of financial 
deepening and inclusion as they have been in achieving financial stability (Kasekende 
2010b; Kasekende 2010a; Beck et al. 2011). 
The historical narratives illustrate the difficulty of striking a balance between the stabilis-
ing and transformative roles of central banks in financial regulation. Nigeria’s and 
Kenya’s experience in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates how the continued financial 
weakness of private banks, the revenue needs of the government and the need to increase 
the intermediation of financial resources to raise investment levels boosted the preferences 
for a transformative central bank, despite the rising cost of maintaining this regulatory 
regime. On the contrary, Uganda’s recent experience reveals the challenge of strengthen-
ing the central bank’s transformative function in a situation where banks are operating 
very profitably by serving prime borrowers and the government is not dependent on do-
mestic bank finance or private sector taxes. These historical case studies reveal an element 
of path dependence in regulatory reform and the difficulties encountered in deviating from 
historical paths. 
Why is it so difficult to change the roles central banks play? Understanding the determi-
nants of central banks’ roles is essential if a change in their policy is to be promoted and a 
better balance struck between their stabilising and transformative roles. Most of the litera-
ture on financial regulation in developing countries is technical and points to the lack of 
technical capacity in reform-implementing organisations to explain difficulties in regula-
tory reform. While the lack of technical knowledge poses a major challenge to effective 
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reform, this paper suggests a more political approach to explain those difficulties, since 
both the historical narratives and the lessons learned from financial reform programmes in 
other developing countries (Brownbridge et al. 1998; Boone 2005; Haggard / Lee 1993; 
Rodrik 2008) identify the role of politics as another, less well understood key determinant 
of reform success. In particular, the historical narratives illustrate how powerful interests 
in the public and private sectors are able both to frustrate and to promote regulatory 
change. Whether particular interest groups seek to frustrate reform and maintain the status 
quo at the expense of wider society or whether they act as agents for change seems to de-
pend on their financial needs. The purpose of this section is to describe in greater detail 
how financial needs influence the preference for a particular central bank role, and under 
what conditions interest groups can pose a challenge to reforms that seek to improve the 
balance between the stabilising and transformative roles of central banks in financial regu-
lation. 
4.1 Financial needs and central bank behaviour 
The historical narratives of Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya illustrate how the financial needs 
of powerful groups, especially of the government and the banking sector, have shaped 
central bank policy trajectories. These three country cases suggest that two factors are par-
ticularly important in shaping the financial needs of different groups of actors and, as a 
consequence, the roles of central banks in financial regulation: first, the level of develop-
ment of private financial markets, and second, the sources of public finance. The proposi-
tion that the combination of financial market development and sources of public finance 
shape central bank roles follows the logic of political economy models and organisational 
theories of finance. This work argues that the nature of state institutions is shaped by the 
government’s fiscal base and by the relationship between the public and private sectors 
(Moore / Schmitz 2008; Bates / Lien 1985; Pfeffer / Salancik 1978; Maxfield 1991). 
The Level of Financial Market Development and Central Bank Behaviour 
The level of private financial market development determines the opportunities that inter-
est groups in the public sector with the power to influence central bank behaviour have to 
meet their financial needs. Governments, which are in a key position to determine central 
bank policy, lack an important source of finance where the domestic financial sector is 
weakly developed in terms of size, efficiency and maturity structure and where banks are 
not financially sound. In this situation, governments whose financial needs exceed reve-
nues have a strong interest in pushing for a central bank that lends money to finance gov-
ernment deficits, promotes the development of financial markets and adopts regulation 
that promotes the allocation of capital to parastatal enterprises, economic development 
projects and the private sector, whose growth will also increase the tax base. In other 
words, when the government’s financial needs exceed revenues and are beyond what pri-
vate financial markets offer, it typically wants a central bank that is not inflation-averse 
(Cukierman 1992, 450) and focuses less on its stabilising role and more on its transforma-
tive role (Maxfield 1994). 
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The financial needs of interest groups in the private sector may also shape central bank 
policy. In general, governments may have two reasons to take into account the interests of 
private investors in the policy-making process: first, they depend on the inflow of finan-
cial resources to perform their functions, and private investors providing tax income, party 
donations or, if they are banks, credit are often the primary source of funds. Second, poli-
ticians need private investors to invest in their own jurisdictions in order to maintain a 
minimum level of economic prosperity that assures the government of popular acceptance 
and increases its chances of staying in power (Bates / Lien 1985; Winters 1996). Com-
pared to producers, banks tend to exert a particularly powerful influence on policy-making 
because of their ability to withhold much needed financial resources from the government 
and because they influence macroeconomic performance more generally by channelling 
resources to the real economy (Thurow 1989; Zysman 1983; Maxfield 1990). 
The central bank policy that private sector interest groups, prefer depends on their finan-
cial needs. Private investors in productive sectors tend to form an interest group opposed 
to a conservative, stabilising central bank where financial markets are weakly developed 
and where they themselves lack adequate access to investment finance. In contrast, where 
the financial sector is well developed and willing to meet their financial needs, producers 
are less reliant on a transformative central bank. Similarly, banks tend to form an interest 
group opposed to a central bank that emphasises its stabilising and neglects its transforma-
tive role where the banking sector is weakly developed in terms of size, efficiency and 
liquidity and not financially sound. In such a situation, banks are likely to form a constitu-
ency that supports a transformative central bank, providing recourse to central bank over-
draft facilities or adopting enabling regulation. In contrast, where the banking sector is 
well developed and financially sound, banks are less reliant on a transformative central 
bank. Such banks are likely to form a strong constituency for a stabilising central bank 
because they fear the cost of inflation due to loose monetary policy, pressure to lend funds 
based on political criteria or unfair competition from banks that receive public support. 
Sources of public finance and central bank behaviour 
The level of domestic financial sector development alone cannot explain government pref-
erences for particular central bank roles: sources of public finance are also important de-
terminants. Although financial markets have remained weakly developed in terms of size 
and inclusiveness in both Nigeria and Uganda, to take two examples from the historical 
narratives, government preferences as regards the role played by central banks in financial 
regulation differ: historically, the Nigerian government has shown a preference for a trans-
formative central bank, whereas the Ugandan government has, for almost two decades, 
preferred a stabilising central bank. This suggests that the level of development of the do-
mestic financial sector explains only part of the story. There is empirical evidence that 
public policy is also determined by the nature of major sources of public finance, such as 
private sector taxes, international aid and natural resource exports, the last two sources 
being particularly important in many African countries (Winters 1994; Bräutigam et al. 
2008; Moore 2004). The sources of public finance matter for policy-making because the 
suppliers of financial resources may attach conditions to their use (Winters 1994, 447). 
This implies that government discretion over the end use of funds varies with their 
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sources. For instance, there are indications that states dependent on taxes as a major source 
of government revenue (as opposed to such other sources as aid or natural resource rents) 
are more likely to bargain with their citizens over what goods, policies and services (e.g. 
regulation to promote financial development) the state provides in exchange for tax pay-
ments (Bräutigam et al. 2008). In those countries, policies are more likely to reflect tax-
payers’ preferences for particular economic policies or to be oriented towards widening 
the tax base because of the lack of alternative sources of public revenue. 
In contrast, where countries depend on aid inflows as a source of public finance, the 
state’s need to bargain over policies with citizens as taxpayers seems reduced. Yet gov-
ernment discretion over the end use of aid may still be restrained where donors are in a 
position to impose conditions on governments in exchange for the funds they provide. 
Since many donors and international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), tend to have a preference for a central bank 
that plays a stabilising role, it is more likely to play that role in countries which are highly 
dependent on aid to finance public expenditure. Donor preferences, combined with less 
pressure on the government to widen the tax base and develop deep and inclusive financial 
markets because it has access to finance from donors and the domestic banking system, 
may thus partly explain Uganda’s historical tendency to favour a stabilising central bank 
in the context of a weakly developed banking sector.6 
Government discretion over the end use of natural resource revenues tends to be high. As 
a result, domestic factors seem to be the main determinants of government preferences 
regarding central bank roles in natural-resource-dependent economies. In these countries, 
the government’s preference for a particular central bank role depends on the quality of its 
management of natural resource revenues: in many countries, reliance on natural resources 
as the sole source of public finance, combined with the volatility of natural resource export 
revenues, has led to considerable budget deficits, their magnitude due to a tendency to in-
crease public spending at times of high oil revenues, which has been difficult to reverse at 
times of lower revenues. Where budget deficits are large, governments tend to prefer a cen-
tral bank that meets the need to finance the state apparatus and development more generally. 
Natural-resource-dependent developing countries have two other features that increase the 
likelihood of their governments preferring a central bank that emphasises its transforma-
tive rather than its stabilising role. First, such countries tend to be lacking in economic 
                                                 
6 Learning from global experience, donors and IFIs (particularly the World Bank) have more recently 
changed their set of ideas on financial regulation in developing countries and increasingly accepted that 
the role of regulators may go beyond stabilising the financial system and institution-building and in-
clude more actively creating an enabling environment for financial sector development (De la Torre et 
al. 2007; Beck et al. 2009). In Uganda the new set of ideas on the role of regulators in the international 
community, combined with the influence of donors on macroeconomic and financial policy, may partly 
explain the BoU’s recent move to more active promotion of the development of a banking system that 
better meets the needs of the real economy. However, if this conjecture is to be confirmed, more sys-
tematic research needs to conducted into the role of various donors and IFIs in shaping central bank 
policy in different types of countries with varying levels of aid-dependence and domestic political com-
petition. 
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diversification. As this makes them vulnerable to negative commodity price shocks, their 
governments are likely to push for a transformative central bank that promotes diversifica-
tion by improving the channelling of financial resources to the non-oil sectors of the real 
economy. The case of Nigeria and its FSS 2020 Strategy demonstrates these dynamics. 
Second, many natural-resource-dependent economies are rentier states. Where natural 
resource revenues are abundant and local business is weakly developed, access to gov-
ernment funds and protectionist policies tend to constitute the only, or the easiest, route to 
wealth (Winters 1996; Moore / Schmitz 2008, 40-41; Karl 1997; Utomi et al. 2007). As 
political supporters expect governments to reward them by sharing natural resource rents 
or at least implementing preferential policies, governments endeavouring to secure power 
are likely to push for a transformative central bank that promotes financial development 
and access to finance for their constituencies. 
4.2 Financial needs and incentives for regulatory capture 
The proposition that the financial needs of powerful interest groups shape central bank 
roles implies an element of path dependency in central bank policy trajectories. Together 
with sources of public finance, financial structures create incentives for powerful interest 
groups to encourage or discourage reforms that seek to improve the balance between the 
stabilising and transformative roles of central banks in financial regulation. Table 2 gives 
an overview of these dynamics in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya in the past decennium. 
The historical narratives suggest that the particular role a central bank plays in financial 
regulation reinforces the nature of financial markets and dependence on particular sources 
of public finance. Where central banks emphasise their transformative rather than their 
stabilising role by directing credit to sectors deemed important for development or by con-
stantly bailing out banks, they are likely to increase inflation and financial instability, par-
ticularly by reducing the incentives within banks to control credit risks internally (moral 
hazard). Both high inflation, which erodes interest rate earnings, and moral hazard con-
strain the development of a sound banking sector, which forms the basis of financial deep-
ening and inclusion. At the same time, a weak banking sector encourages politicians, 
banks and producers to push central banks towards a more transformative role. This sce-
nario reflects the experience of Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and many other developing coun-
tries during the 1970s and 1980s. Where central banks emphasise their stabilising rather 
than their transformative role by adopting regulation that far outweighs the risks it is in-
tended to mitigate, they may create an environment that favours the emergence of profit-
able and resilient banks which target low-risk segments at the higher end of the market; 
however, such central banks create an environment that may impede the emergence of 
innovative financial service providers who target more risky segments, such as agriculture. 
A lack of risk-based, proportionate supervision, indicating room for innovation, may con-
strain the development of a banking sector that meets the financial needs of the real econ-
omy. At the same time, a sound financial sector reinforces the preference of politicians 
and banks for a conservative central bank. In particular, banks may form a strong constitu-
ency for the regulatory status quo if they fear new competitors. 
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The cases of Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya also demonstrate how the sources of public fi-
nance reinforce central bank behaviour. The case of Nigeria shows how oil-dependence 
has strengthened the preference for a transformative central bank. The case of Uganda 
indicates the difficulties of fostering the transformative role of a central bank in a context 
of aid-dependence and a powerful, but exclusive, banking sector. The Kenyan case illus-
trates how government dependence on both international actors with a preference for a 
stabilising central bank and on the domestic private sector with mixed preferences regard-
ing central bank policy has led to and reinforced the preference for a central bank that 
promotes both development and stabilisation. The historical perspective reveals that, once 
embarked on, it is hard to deviate from a particular path of financial regulation. 
Regulatory capture 
The powerful interest groups that have shaped specific central bank roles have strong in-
centives to maintain the regulatory status quo and capture reforms, even at the expense of 
society as a whole. The experiences of Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya illustrate how capture, 
defined as “the control of the regulatory process by those whom it is supposed to regulate 
or by a narrow subset of those affected by regulation” (Mattli / Woods 2009, 13), has 
shaped central bank policy trajectories and prevented regulatory reform processes from 
fully attaining their objectives and intended scope.7 Regulatory capture by banks and other 
groups has been a major challenge to reforms designed to improve the balance between 
the stabilising and transformative roles of central banks, not only in the three African case 
study countries, but globally (Mosley / Singer 2009; Beck et al. 2003). Typical results of 
such capture are: absence of regulation where capture groups would otherwise incur costs 
(for example, credit bureau legislation would require banks to pay fees for accessing credit 
information and to invest in credit reporting capacities); absence of regulation where rules 
would eliminate privileges of particular groups (for example, regulation that would pre-
clude subsidised credit schemes primarily to the benefit of politically connected groups); 
regulation that is not enforceable or enforced (for example, increases in prudential re-
quirements without corresponding increases in supervisory capacity). 
Empirical evidence suggests that three main factors encourage regulatory capture: a lack 
of information about regulatory reform processes; the secretive and closed nature of regu-
lating agencies; and the existence of small, powerful groups with a shared interest in main-
taining the regulatory status quo (Mattli / Woods 2009). 
Groups will be more likely to capture regulatory reforms where detailed information on 
the deficiencies of the regulatory status quo is absent or biased, since adversely affected 
constituencies have no motivation to demand change. Regulatory change will be less 
                                                 
7 The rest of this chapter and the next chapter build on the work of Mattli and Woods (2009), who explore 
the factors that encourage the capture of economic and human rights regulation at global level. The fol-
lowing sections complement their work by examining regulatory capture at national level, focusing on 
the domestic regulation of finance and on the specific features of developing countries that affect regula-
tory capture. 
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likely, for example, where society at large lacks information on the cost to taxpayers of 
bailing out banks or on the effectiveness of subsidised credit schemes even if there is a 
public consensus that current regulation is deficient. Biased information, such as a study 
produced by the banking sector on the economic cost of stricter prudential regulation, will 
also reduce the motivation of groups affected by poor regulation to demand change. Simi-
larly, groups will be more likely to capture regulatory reforms where central banks are 
closed and secretive institutions. The lack of transparency of regulators and regulatory 
processes reduces the information available on the cost and benefits of regulatory change. 
Moreover, where the central bank is not transparent about the groups involved in or con-
sulted on regulatory reform, outsiders have difficulty establishing how far interest groups 
have opportunities for capture. Finally, capture is more likely to occur where interest 
groups are small and powerful and have a set of shared ideas on the advantages of main-
taining the regulatory status quo: small size helps interest groups to overcome collective 
action problems. If they are key players in concentrated markets (like banks with the larg-
est market share in a typical African country), they tend to carry substantial economic and 
political weight. Power based on financial resources helps them to reward supporters out-
side the group or, if they are private investors, to threaten government with the realloca-
tion of business elsewhere. Power based on technical expertise helps such groups to assess 
the cost and benefits of regulatory change and to develop informed strategies to frustrate 
reforms. A set of shared ideas helps interest groups to rationalise and justify action. 
While banking crises and public outrage tend to lead to the formation of alliances to put 
pressure on those who have captured regulation, once the damage has been done, it is usu-
ally difficult to reverse. To reduce the risks and cost of regulatory capture, it is essential to 
influence the conditions which entrench capture. The next section recommends some ways 
in which donors, as facilitators of reform processes in Africa, can mitigate the risk of the 
capture of reforms that seek to improve the balance between the stabilising and transfor-
mative roles of central banks. 
5 Supporting reforms of financial regulation in contexts of capture 
To make donor support for the reform of financial regulation more effective, it is essential 
to address the challenge of regulatory capture in four key areas: the availability of infor-
mation; the transparency and openness of central banks; the engagement in the reform 
process of concentrated groups with a stake in better regulation; and the use of political 
economy analysis in programme design. Measures in the first three areas help to address 
regulatory capture directly by changing conditions that encourage regulatory capture. 
Measures in the last area, the use of political economy analysis, help to address political 
capture indirectly and imply a more general change in the ways donors work and manage 
political risks. Working in all four areas helps to ensure that concentrated groups defend-
ing the status quo do not succeed in distorting or hijacking the process of regulatory 
change. 
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5.1 Making information available 
Addressing the challenge of regulatory capture requires donors to motivate public de-
mand for change by improving the quality and availability of public information on the 
cost and benefits of regulatory reform. Information that reveals the cost of capture to soci-
ety may generate a demand from the wider public for remedial regulation. The greater the 
scale and scope of the externality, the broader and more insistent will be the demand for 
regulatory change. However, high information costs discourage many from assessing the 
social damage done by capture. Therefore, usually only a small circle of experts know 
how much poor regulatory regimes cost. In contrast, the general public, who are also af-
fected by poor prudential or enabling regulation, do not have precise or independent 
knowledge of these costs. More accessible and timely information is thus key to the moti-
vation of a large and sustained group to act for change. In Nigeria, for example, the CBN 
strengthened prudential regulation in 2009/2010, when the level of fraud within banks and 
the cost of bailing them out became public and was widely debated. 
Donors have begun to put more effort into providing the public and the financial sector 
with high-quality information and evidence-based policy advice. Carrying out or commis-
sioning research and ensuring the timely sharing of findings with regulators, public agen-
cies and financial service providers has become one of the core activities undertaken by 
donors. In Kenya, for instance, a number of development partners have set up a trust, the 
Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Programme, one of whose main objectives is to pro-
vide policy advice on regulatory reform based on financial market analysis. The trust has 
been quite successful in raising awareness and making information available about issues 
on the regulatory reform agenda, such as financial consumer protection and credit bureau 
development. In Nigeria, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have set up the organisation Enhancing Financial 
Innovation and Access (EFInA), which disseminates information and identifies regulatory 
obstacles with a view to encouraging reform. In interviews in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya 
both central bank officials and groups representing reform-minded constituencies, such as 
consumer protection organisations, stressed the value of “on-the-ground information” and 
micro data. Recent GIZ research on the organisation and viability of microfinance banks 
in Nigeria and the EFInA and FSD financial access surveys8 are just two examples of this 
kind of information. Donors have also launched activities to improve the quality of public 
information. In Nigeria, for instance, the GIZ cooperates with the radio station Deutsche 
Welle in offering training in financial reporting. 
As donors have taken many important steps to improve the information available to the 
public, they should build on existing activities: to minimise capture, they should widen the 
focus by targeting and working with a wider range of actors and by evaluating the impacts 
of existing regulation. Thus far, much of the information that donors have assembled or 
generated is accessible to the public, but the main targets are financial service providers 
                                                 
8 Both the EFInA and the FSD financial access survey rely on the Finscope consumer survey methodolo-
gy, which has been widely used to measure financial access in Africa. It was developed by FinMark 
Trust, a non-profit, independent trust, mainly funded by DFID. 
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and regulators. Targeting the wider public or interest groups outside the government and 
the financial sector will help to minimise capture. There may also be additional benefits of 
partnering with a wider range of institutions that carry out research within and outside the 
public sector. Such institutions may be statistical services and central bank research de-
partments, but they also include academic bodies. In many cases regulators have set up 
schemes and passed laws aimed at fostering financial system development or stability, 
without keeping the public informed of their impacts. Donors should motivate public de-
mand for regulatory change by evaluating such initiatives and publishing the results. 
5.2 Promoting central bank transparency and openness 
Mitigating the risk of regulatory capture requires donors to promote the transparency of 
regulatory reform processes by enhancing central bank transparency and openness. The 
more transparent and open the regulatory reform process is, the fewer will be the opportu-
nities for capture and the more likely the central bank will be accountable to societal de-
mands. Transparency and openness in the reform process reduce opportunities for capture 
because the public are more readily able to determine whether interest groups are interfer-
ing in the reform process. In contrast, secretiveness and exclusiveness of reform processes 
may leave central banks open to being bullied by interest groups without the public being 
aware. Transparency and openness in the regulatory process are also likely to increase 
central bank accountability to society at large because the latter can effectively demand a 
response to its concerns only where it is able to provide evidence of the cost and benefits 
of regulatory reform. 
Although there is room for improvement, central banks have enhanced transparency and 
openness significantly over the past decade. African regulators have made a number of 
changes to the ways they work and present themselves publicly. They have enhanced 
transparency and openness by maintaining internet websites, on which they make abun-
dant material, particularly working papers, statistical datasets and new regulation, avail-
able to the public. Central banks have also increased private sector consultation at various 
stages of reform processes. In Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya, for example, central banks 
meet the commercial banking sector regularly and frequently. While the central banks tend 
to set the agendas for these meetings, banking officials emphasised in interviews that the 
meetings were essential if reforms were to be influenced at the design stage. In Uganda, 
for instance, credit bureau regulation was designed in close consultation with the commer-
cial banking sector. 
While central bank transparency and openness have improved, broadening the private 
sector consultation process and improving transparency at all stages of the reform proc-
ess, from rule-making to enforcement, will further reduce the risk of regulatory capture. 
Consultations between central banks and the commercial banking sector have become well 
institutionalised in the process of regulatory change. In contrast, consultations between 
central banks and business member organisations (BMOs) in the productive sector, repre-
senting the consumers of financial services, have remained deficient in many ways. In 
particular, communication with BMOs in the productive sector is much less frequent and 
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regular. Nor are smaller businesses, the backbone of many African economies, effectively 
represented in consultations: as central banks tend to invite mainly large umbrella organi-
sations, which are dominated by large enterprises, the interests of small enterprises receive 
less attention. Establishing channels that make central banks more open to smaller busi-
nesses and public groups will help to mitigate risks of regulatory capture by large banks 
and other powerful interests. Oversight offices that offer individuals and groups a forum to 
provide feedback on or challenge central bank policy may be a promising route. More 
generally, donors should ensure that there is more openness with respect not only to rule-
making but also to the implementation and enforcement of rules. Central banks tend to be 
secretive organisations by nature, but there are ways of holding them accountable for rule 
implementation and enforcement. Publishing the names of beneficiaries of particular cen-
tral bank schemes and evaluations of central bank regulatory activities are just two exam-
ples of ways of reducing a central bank’s vulnerability to capture. 
5.3 Strengthening the engagement of interest groups with a stake in change 
Addressing the challenge of regulatory capture requires donors to strengthen the engage-
ment of concentrated interest groups with a stake in change in the reform process because 
the wider public lack the means of effectively demanding such change. The public are at a 
distinct disadvantage relative to concentrated groups with a stake in the regulatory status 
quo. This disadvantage arises from three major factors. First, the public’s resources tend to 
be more modest (particularly when compared to banks’ resources). Second, public knowl-
edge of regulatory issues, which are often technical, is limited. Third, there are too many 
members of the public for collective action problems to be easily overcome. For these 
reasons, the public are unlikely to be effective in demanding regulatory change on their 
own. They will need the support of concentrated interest groups that have a stake in regu-
latory change and the resources, power and expertise necessary to challenge the regulatory 
status quo. To support regulatory change, these groups may seek to sustain public interest 
by providing information at critical junctures of the regulatory process. Alternatively, they 
may seek to empower poorly resourced groups adversely affected by the regulatory status 
quo by offering technical expertise or finance during the process of change. Subsets of two 
types of groups may have the interest and the power to support the wider public in de-
manding change and should be strengthened and involved in the reform debate: public 
officials and private corporations. 
Public officials, including regulators, have long been at the core of discussions on regula-
tory reform. While some public officials are subject to capture, others have an interest in 
regulatory change and become powerful supporters of the wider public and use their re-
sources, expertise and authority to shape regulation. Whether particular public officials 
support change depends to a significant degree on their personal preferences, constraints 
and incentives. However, public officials also tend to be more susceptible to the idea of 
change where they are embedded in a network of policy-makers who share a set of ideas 
favourable to regulatory change, ideas that provide a basis for the formation of coalitions 
pressing for regulatory change (Mattli / Woods 2009, 37). Regulators interviewed in 
Kenya and Uganda, for instance, emphasised the importance of exchanging knowledge 
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with reform-minded public officials in neighbouring countries. Knowledge exchange 
across borders helps to encourage regulatory change because it facilitates learning about 
and the development of new sets of ideas on the framing and justification of reforms. Peer-
learning among members of the East African Community may have been an important 
motive for the greater emphasis recently placed by the BoU on financial system develop-
ment issues and financial literacy. In 2010, for instance, the Kenya’s Central Bank Gover-
nor, who has put considerable effort into promoting financial inclusion in Kenya and other 
developing countries, delivered a speech on financial inclusion at the BoU that sparked a 
discussion within both the BoU and the wider public about the role of regulators in pro-
moting financial development and intermediation (Juuko 2011; Bank of Uganda 2010). 
While private corporations have long been neglected in discussions on regulatory reform, 
they can form powerful reform coalitions. Among both providers and consumers of finan-
cial services there are groups with an interest in regulatory change who can effectively 
support the wider public, because they have both the resources and the technical expertise 
to shake up financial regulation. Both newcomers and established banks among financial 
service providers may be powerful supporters of regulatory change. Newcomers entering 
the sector after regulation has been captured will oppose the regulatory status quo if estab-
lished banks enjoy privileges under the current regulatory regime. Established banks will 
be powerful supporters of regulatory change if they have suffered from poor regulation 
and regard a new regulatory regime as a means of restoring credibility and trust. Among 
consumers of financial services, established firms tend to be more concentrated than the 
general public and may become powerful supporters of regulatory change if they rely on 
bank finance and have suffered as a result of financial instability and/or the provision of a 
limited range of financial services. 
Donors have come to realise the importance of systematically strengthening groups of 
concentrated actors in the public and financial sectors and encouraging them to address 
regulatory capture. It has become a core activity of donors to provide technical and finan-
cial support for public officials at federal level and for financial service providers with a 
view to improving their engagement in regulatory change. Over the past decade, donors 
have sought to involve concentrated interest groups with a stake in reform in the debate on 
regulatory reform by providing fora for dialogue and the exchange of ideas. The GIZ, for 
instance, administers the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), a knowledge network of 
central banks and other financial regulatory bodies in developing countries. AFI provides 
a platform for exchanges on reform strategies and allows reform-minded actors to form 
coalitions centred on a set of shared ideas. AFI also identifies and promotes “policy cham-
pions”, outstanding policy-makers who have substantially contributed to increasing access 
to financial services for the unbanked population. In particular, AFI facilitates the partici-
pation of policy champions in global and regional events, where they can share their 
knowledge and experience, and equips them with tools for presenting their regulatory ex-
periences (Alliance for Financial Inclusion 2009). Another outstanding example of an ef-
fort to engage actors with a stake in reform in the debate on regulatory reform is the Part-
nership for Making Finance Work for Africa, which was founded by a disparate group of 
donors. This initiative supports the development of African financial sectors by providing 
a platform for African governments, development partners and the private sector to coor-
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dinate financial sector development policies across the continent. Donors have also in-
creasingly targeted microfinance institutions and commercial banks that seek to reach out 
to unserved market segments. In Kenya, for instance, DFID has given considerable sup-
port to Equity Bank, which targets the lower end of the market and has now the largest 
client base of all banks in Kenya (FSD Kenya 2010, 9). In alliance with other banks target-
ing the same segment, Equity Bank has become a powerful supporter of regulatory change 
to create a more enabling environment and to foster macroeconomic stability. 
Donors should build on existing activities to strengthen the engagement of concentrated 
interest groups with a stake in change and target a broader range of groups that have an 
interest in challenging the regulatory status quo and have the necessary resources. Thus 
far, donor activities have focused on involving reform-minded public officials at federal 
level and financial service providers in the debate on regulatory reform. Targeting further 
actors, such as public officials at lower tiers of government and private corporations, will 
help to address the challenge of capture more effectively. State governments offer an entry 
point for collaboration with public officials at local level. In a federal state like Nigeria 
they account for the largest proportion of public expenditure and probably for the worst 
abuses of public office (Utomi et al. 2007, 15). Supporting reform-minded public officials 
at state level will help to make regulatory reforms in contexts of capture more effective. 
BMOs offer an entry point for collaboration with private corporations that represent the 
interests of firms that would benefit from regulatory change. Donors should leverage their 
resources to help build the capacity of BMOs in policy analysis and advocacy of regula-
tory change. In this context, it is important to acknowledge that promoting transparency 
and accountability through BMOs is not a risk-free strategy, since some BMOs may be 
linked to those concentrated interest groups that prefer the regulatory status quo. Yet key 
lessons learnt point to the need to work with a wide range of partners in reform pro-
grammes, including BMOs, with a view to both broadening the support base for reforms 
and maintaining flexibility in case one group of partners is no longer willing or able to 
support the reform process. 
5.4 Using political economy analysis in programme design 
Addressing the risk of regulatory capture in reform programmes requires donors to use 
political economy analysis systematically in programme design. While regulatory reform 
programmes have become successful and sustainable operations in many African coun-
tries, they have encountered political obstacles to the attainment of their objectives and 
intended scope in the majority of countries. Donors have therefore come to the conclusion 
that technically sound knowledge of financial regulation and development is not enough 
for programmes to succeed. Interviewees in the domestic private and public sectors in Ni-
geria, Uganda and Kenya were unanimous in emphasising the need for donors to improve 
their understanding of the political context and of the constraints faced by domestic actors 
in processes of regulatory change. Aid officials also referred to political risks and regula-
tory capture as key challenges to effective support for reform processes. Political economy 
analysis is a key instrument for improving the effectiveness of regulatory reform pro-
grammes, because it allows donors to identify political risks and reform-minded actors. In 
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particular, political economy analysis helps donors to understand and predict policy deci-
sions of central banks and other public institutions by revealing the links between political 
and economic processes and their social, cultural and historical context. 
Donors have realised that using political economy analysis to inform the design of finan-
cial reform programmes can mitigate political risks; yet systematic evidence on the politi-
cal economy of financial regulation in African countries has still to be gathered. Donors 
have conducted political economy studies at country level, and for some donors political 
economy analysis has had far-reaching implications for policy, programming and man-
agement. DFID’s Nigeria office, for instance, has adopted political economy analysis as a 
routine part of its working methods (DFID 2009, 15). To a more limited extent, donors 
have also conducted political economy studies at sectoral level, but have not yet published 
studies on the political economy of financial reform in specific African countries. Instead, 
most donors assess political risks at the beginning of a financial reform programme cycle, 
but the assessment is not based on a systematic analysis of political risks and opportunities 
for the reform programme. Political risk management is based less on formal analysis than 
on the tacit knowledge of senior staff in the country offices and on “learning by doing”. 
If political economy analysis is to be used to maximise the effectiveness of reform pro-
grammes, donors must adapt their work routines and management of political challenges 
accordingly. Using political economy analysis will help financial reform programmes to 
achieve their full scope and objectives and implies that donors must change their working 
methods in two major respects: first, if political economy analysis and monitoring capaci-
ties are to be strengthened, donors must place greater emphasis on in-depth country 
knowledge, rely more on in-country expertise and avoid the rapid turnover of country of-
fice staff, since that prevents them from developing the necessary country knowledge. 
Second, if the roles of relevant stakeholders in the reform process are to be analysed from 
a political economy perspective, donors must become more aware of their own role as 
political actors. Donors should explore and address the incentives to which they them-
selves are exposed and which may prevent the risks of capture from being mitigated in the 
longer term. Examples of such incentives are the disbursement of more funds, the fulfil-
ment of expectations of quick wins, and the failure to withdraw support from prestigious 
government partners if they have not demonstrated adequate willingness to support 
change. More generally, donors should use a political economy perspective to reflect more 
deeply on how they can best exercise influence in contexts where capture may pose a chal-
lenge and where dependence on aid is limited or decreasing. 
6 Conclusion 
There are strong arguments for countries to seek to strike a balance between the stabilising 
and transformative roles of their central banks in financial regulation. Yet African coun-
tries have had difficulty implementing reforms that strike such a balance, because interest 
groups with the power to shape central bank behaviour tend to prefer the regulatory status 
quo and have incentives to capture regulatory reform processes. 
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Asked for their views on how to make the support of such reforms more effective in con-
texts of capture, some aid officials suggested during the field research for this paper the 
creation of “a world of technical details” through the drafting of more intricate technical 
reform plans under the leadership of foreign experts, who are more insulated from the do-
mestic political process. 
This paper suggests an approach that is markedly different from this. On the basis of em-
pirical evidence collected in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya, it argues that donors should sys-
tematically address the challenges arising from regulatory capture by strengthening do-
mestic countervailing actors and coalitions and using insights from political economy 
analysis. “Creating a world of technical details” in the reform process is unlikely to work 
in contexts where the roles played by the central bank are determined not only by the in-
terests of society at large, but also by powerful interest groups in the public and private 
sectors. Experience at country level suggests that the interest groups which have shaped 
specific central bank roles over an extended period have strong incentives to maintain the 
regulatory status quo, even if this is at the expense of society as a whole. Supporting pub-
lic officials and private corporations with a stake in regulatory reform and engaging them 
in reform debates may therefore be a promising route for donors to follow, not least be-
cause these groups often have greater legitimacy and carry more political weight in the 
domestic arena. 
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